0473-93 Ottawa Board of Education,
Applicant v. Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation
- Educational Assistants, Respondent
0474-93 Ottawa Board of Education,
Applicant v. Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation
- Custodians, Maintenance and Cafeteria Workers, Respondent
0475-93 Ottawa Board of Education,
Applicant v. Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation
- Speech Language Pathologists, Respondent
0485-94 Ontario Secondary School
Teachers' Federation - Educational Assistants, Applicant
v. Ottawa Board of Education, Respondent
0486-94 Ontario Secondary School
Teachers' Federation and Group of Employees - Speech Language Pathologists,
Applicants v. Ottawa Board of Education, Respondent
0487-94 Ontario Secondary School
Teachers' Federation - Plant and Support Staff Unit, Applicant
v. Ottawa Board of Education, Respondent
Before: Phyllis Gordon, Chair;
Bruce Budd and Charles Taccone, Members
Appearances: Carolyn Kay-Aggio,
Rand Lintell and Joanne Glaser for Ottawa Board of Education; Cindy
Wilkey and Lynn Hopkins for Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation
Cite As: Ottawa Board of Education
(1995), 6 P.E.R. 45
Jurisdiction - Scope of Hearing
The Tribunal rejected the Board's position that it
might only consider those issues contained in the Review Officer's
order. Such an approach would permit the Tribunal's jurisdiction to
be predetermined by the Review Officer without regard to the issues
the parties brought to Review Services. At the same time, the Tribunal
declined to consider issues which were never part of the parties negotiations
and which Review Services had not fully considered.
Compétence - Envergure de l'audience
Le Tribunal a rejeté la position du Conseil
qui voulait qu'il n'étudie que les questions figurant dans
l'ordre de l'agent de révision. Une telle démarche supposerait
que la compétence du Tribunal serait fixée à
l'avance par l'agent de révision quelles que soient les questions
que les parties avaient soulevées devant les Services de révision.
Le Tribunal a conclu que les questions que les Services de révision
n'avaient pas eu suffisamment le temps d'étudier ou que le
Conseil et le syndicat n'avaient pas négociées en cee
qui concerne les unités de négociation visées
par le différend étaient prématurées.
DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL, FEBRUARY 14, 1995
1. The Ottawa Board of Education, (the "Employer"),
has made three Applications to the Tribunal seeking to quash Orders
of the Review Officer, which direct the Employer to bargain pay equity
with the Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation, (the "Union")
for each of three different bargaining units in Files 0473-93, 0474-93,
and 0475-93. The Union seeks to have the Orders upheld and has filed
Cross-Applications with respect to each of the bargaining units in
Files 0485-94, 0486-94, and 0487-94. These essentially assert that
the Employer's posted plan violates the Pay Equity Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. P.7 as amended (the "Act") and that the Employer's
plan is no longer appropriate. The Union asks the Tribunal to make
certain declarations including findings that the comparison system
used by the Employer is gender biased, that the posted pay equity
plan is inappropriate for the three bargaining units and that it does
not conform to the requirements of the Act. The Union seeks
orders which direct the Employer to bargain in good faith for each
of the three bargaining units, and the parties to use the Union's
comparison system as the basis of their negotiations.
2. This ruling deals with the Employer's preliminary
objection that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the matters
raised in the Cross-Applications of the Union or the allegations of
violations of the Act raised in the Union's Responses to
the Applications to quash. The basis of the objection is twofold:
that the Tribunal is limited to consideration of the reasoning and
outcome of the Orders of the Review Officer; and, that the Union's
pleadings are premature in that they raise issues that have not been
adequately canvassed at Review Services.
CONTEXT
3. The case at the Tribunal arises in the context
of a complex set of relationships and a detailed pay equity chronology.
We briefly outline the relations in paragraphs 5 to 9 in order to
provide a framework for the preliminary objection and our decision.
4. The Employer posted a pay equity plan for its
non-union employees on September 1, 1989, and on October 22, 1990,
it posted a plan which it had negotiated with the Ottawa Board of
Educational Employees Union ("OBEEU").
5. The Union became the bargaining agent for the
Plant and Support Staff Unit ("PSSU") on May 22,1991. This unit includes
custodian, maintenance and cafeteria workers who were formerly represented
by the OBEEU, and who were covered by the negotiated plan posted on
October 22, 1990. On February 24, 1993, the Review Officer ordered
the Employer to negotiate pay equity with the Union for this bargaining
unit.
6. The Union became the bargaining agent for the
Educational Assistants ("EA") on March 24, 1992. This unit is comprised
of educational assistants, formerly called teachers' aides. These
employees were covered in the pay equity plan originally posted by
the Employer in 1989. On May 28, 1993, the Review Officer ordered
the Employer to negotiate pay equity with the Union for this bargaining
unit.
7. The Union received an interim certificate that
it was the bargaining agent for the Speech Language Pathologists ("SLP")
on November 19, 1992, and was certified as the bargaining agent on
July 12, 1993. The members of this unit had worked at the Ottawa Board
of Education on secondment from the Children's Hospital of Eastern
Ontario, until September 1, 1992, when they became employees of the
Board. They were not included in the original posted plan but were
placed in the plan by the Employer when they became Board employees.
The Review Officer ordered the Employer to negotiate pay equity with
the Union for this unit on May 28, 1993.
8. The Union was also certified as the bargaining
agent for the Professional Student Services Personnel ("PSSP") unit
in late May, 1990, although this unit is not the subject of any of
the Orders before us. The employees in the PSSP unit had been covered
in the posted non-union plan. The parties, however, reached an agreement
in January of 1992 to negotiate pay equity. At the same time pay equity
complaints which had been filed at Review Services prior to the certification
of the bargaining unit were withdrawn. The parties led considerable
evidence about what occurred at Review Services between the Employer
and the PSSP unit, even though the Orders before us do not deal with
this unit. While we were advised that the negotiations have not been
successful and that the parties have been at Review Services, the
substance of the bargaining negotiations was without prejudice and
thus not in evidence.
EVOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE
9. In our view, the multi-faceted nature of the relationship
between the parties and the considerable amount of time which has
passed have influenced the formulation of the issues which are at
the Tribunal. As the process to date between the parties and the characterization
of the stage they are at now is relevant to the determination of the
preliminary objection, we set out our assessment of how the issues
in dispute evolved in paragraphs 10 to 16.
10. The evidence indicates that when it became the
bargaining agent for each of the four bargaining units, the Union
advised the Employer that it wished to bargain a new pay equity plan
on behalf of the employees. At that time it was the Union's position
that certification was a change of circumstance in the establishment
which rendered the plan inappropriate pursuant to ss.22(2)(b) of the
Act.
11. The Employer's initial position with respect
to the three bargaining units which are the subject of the Orders
before the Tribunal was that certification subsequent to the posting
of a plan does not meet the requirements of ss.22(2)(b). This view
was shortly thereafter amplified and the Employer's position was that
if the Union was able to demonstrate that the Plan violated the Act
or was no longer appropriate, the Employer would have the obligation
to negotiate those offending elements with the Union. This position
has been maintained by the Employer in its dealings with the Union,
its submissions to Review Services, and its pleadings at the Tribunal.
12. The Review Officer held the view that post-plan
certification was sufficient to trigger the obligation to negotiate
and so advised the parties throughout the process and prior to issuing
her Orders.
13. The parties disagree about the timing and extent
to which the Union raised its concerns about the Employer's comparison
system and plan, in the context of the EA, SLP and PSSU bargaining
units while they were at Review Services. Much of the evidence was
led with the intent of establishing that the Union had or had not
raised its allegations, and to what extent. We have reviewed the extensive
evidence regarding the timing and content of meetings, letters, and
conversations. On balance, we agree with the Employer's view that
the Union did not actively pursue the substance of the allegations
with respect to the gender neutrality of the comparison systems in
the discussions, correspondence or meetings respecting the three units.
We do find however that the Union did raise certain problems with
the plan at Review Services with respect to two of the bargaining
units. With respect to the PSSU bargaining unit, the Union raised
the appropriateness of the job rates in the original plan negotiated
by the OBEEU and the Employer and alleged that the process of negotiating
that plan had been a "sweetheart deal" between the Union and the Employer.
With respect to the SLP unit, the Union expressed its concern that
salaries had been improperly determined when the speech language pathologists
became employees of the Employer. The Union admits that the main issue
discussed was its right to bargain.
14. In its presentation of the evidence and its argument,
the Union placed great emphasis on what was canvassed at Review Services
with respect to the PSSP bargaining unit. It is common ground that
the Union made its allegations about the lack of gender neutrality
of the comparison system used by the Employer and about violations
of the Act at those discussions. (The PSSP is the bargaining
unit for which the Employer had agreed to bargain and which is not
the subject of an Application before the Tribunal.) Essentially the
Union's argument was that although the critique made of the Employer's
comparison system addresses professional student service personnel
specifically, it clearly applies to all employees in the educational
sector, and that some general analysis of the plan was made.
15. Similarly, the Union attempted to establish that
as the comparison system presented and prepared by the Union is of
general application, it was sufficiently the subject of discussion
at Review Services for the purposes of establishing our jurisdiction
to consider its merits in the present Applications.
16. For the purposes of characterizing what actually
occurred at Review Services, we are not ready to assume that discussions
which take place between an Employer and one of its bargaining units
are transferable to another bargaining unit, without some clear indication
that this was the parties' intention. It seems to us that doing so
would do some violence to the integrity of negotiations in general,
and upsets the ordinary expectation of how such discussions occur,
and how understandings are reached. As well, the facts before us do
not support the conclusion we are being asked to make. We note in
particular that the attendance at and the timing of the various meetings,
the postponement of pay equity discussions in some instances by agreement
and the chronology of events are consistent with the view that the
parties were each treating these events as four different sets of
discussions. On the other hand, we note that the Employer cannot claim
that it is surprised with the allegations, given the discussions that
took place with respect to the PSSP.
ARGUMENT AND DECISION REGARDING THE LIMITS
OF TRIBUNAL'S REVIEW OF ORDER
17. The Employer's submission on its preliminary
objection is that the only issue properly before the Tribunal is whether
certification after a plan has been posted and deemed approved compels
a complete renegotiation of pay equity by the Employer and the Union.
It suggests that the Order is restricted to this issue and that the
Tribunal should not consider more than what was in the Order. It also
submits that the Union only suggested that the plan was not appropriate
or that it violated the Act very late in the day, and that
as these issues were not canvassed at Review Services the Tribunal
has no jurisdiction to consider them. It similarly maintains that
the Tribunal cannot consider the comparison system which the Union
prepared or order it to be the basis of a negotiated plan because
it was not discussed at Review Services with respect to these three
bargaining units.
18. The narrower argument advanced by the Employer
is that, as the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to what is in the
Order, we can only consider whether certification leads to an automatic
entitlement to renegotiate the pre-certification pay equity plan.
In this submission Counsel argues that as this case arises under ss.
24(6) of the Act, we are limited to the consideration of
matters "with respect to the order" and she urged a narrow construction
of these words. She submits that we should modify the Scarborough
(No. 1) (1994), 5 P.E.R. 45 decision, in a manner which further
restricts what comes to the Tribunal. In that case the Tribunal held
that the outermost parameters of the issues in any application are
the substantive issues the parties took to Review Services and any
additional issues the Review Officer may have raised and decided by
Order or referred to the Tribunal. Counsel urges that of those issues
which the parties took to Review Services we only consider those which
were decided by Order.
19. We do not agree that this is an appropriate way
to restrict our jurisdiction. The Tribunal's jurisdiction can come
from matters relating to the Order. Northumberland and Newcastle
Board of Education (1992), 3. P.E.R. 50 at para. 8 and 9. As
has been repeatedly noted, the Tribunal is not sitting in appeal from
an Order and it may fully consider all of those substantive matters
which were at Review Services. If we limit the Tribunal's jurisdiction
to what is set out in the Order, then the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
would be pre-determined by the Review Officer in each case, regardless
of the issues which the parties brought to Review Services. We therefore
reject the Employer's submission that we are only entitled to consider
the Order itself.
ARGUMENT AND DECISION RESPECTING TRIBUNAL'S
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE SUBSTANCE OF THE BARGAIN TO BE NEGOTIATED
20. We accept the Employer's challenge to the Tribunal's
jurisdiction to consider much of what is in the Union's pleadings.
We agree that the relief sought by the Union is significantly broader
than the matters which were at Review Services. In particular, we
find we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Union's
comparison system or to order it be used as the basis for any pay
equity negotiations between the parties. On any construction of the
evidence, (remembering that we did not hear about the substance of
the negotiations between the Employer and the PSSP, as they were without
prejudice), the merits of the Union's comparison system were not addressed
at Review Services sufficiently to permit the Tribunal to assume jurisdiction.
21. The Employer's SKEW comparison system was the
subject of some discussion at Review Services. The Union periodically
asked for more detailed information from the Employer regarding the
system and the development of the plan and also raised specific items
that it considered problematic with respect to the plan. However,
we do not find that there were significant discussions of gender bias
sufficient to support the Tribunal's assumption of jurisdiction to
fully review the SKEW system in order to determine whether it should
be the basis of negotiations between the parties.
22. In our view, the request that we ascertain which
comparison system should be the basis of negotiation is premature
in any event. We are not prepared to decide the merits of these questions
which have not only not been sufficiently canvassed at Review Services,
but, more importantly, have not been the subject of bargaining negotiations
between the Union and the Employer with respect to these bargaining
units. If there is an obligation to bargain pay equity, and if after
serious negotiations there is no resolution, then the parties can
return to Review Services for assistance and possibly the Tribunal
for determination of the issues.
ARGUMENT AND DECISION REGARDING SCOPE OF
CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER THERE IS A RIGHT TO BARGAIN
23. In our view, the essence of the dispute at Review
Services was whether the Employer was obligated to negotiate pay equity
plans with the Union for the three bargaining units. The parties and
the Review Officer each adopted a different position to this question
but these differing positions advanced at Review Services are not
determinative of our jurisdiction. The Tribunal has the jurisdiction
to consider the substantive matters which were at Review Services,
(Scarborough (No. 1)) and as in this case, were related to
the Order (Northumberland and Newcastle Board of Education).
We will therefore consider this question and decide, if necessary,
whether in the circumstances of this case, the Employer is required
to bargain pay equity with the Union for the bargaining units in question.
We have the jurisdiction to consider what factors trigger the obligation
to bargain, and in making our decision will not be concerned with
what was or was not discussed at Review Services respecting the relevant
factors or the standards necessary to trigger the obligation to bargain.
24. The Tribunal has already determined that certification,
while a changed circumstance in an establishment, does not, on its
own, compel bargaining pursuant to ss. 22(2)(b) of the Act,
St. Joseph's Villa (1993), 4 P.E.R. 33. This decision was
issued after the parties were at Review Services in this case, and
after the Orders were made. The case did not consider what instances
would amount to a change of circumstances in the establishment which
would render a plan no longer appropriate for the female job classes
to which the employees belong. It is certainly open to the Union to
demonstrate whether there are changes of circumstances sufficient
to render the plan no longer appropriate.
25. We note that where either party believes that
the plan is no longer appropriate because of a change of circumstances
in the establishment, it may issue a notice to bargain to the other
party pursuant to s.14.1 of the Act. In the case before us
this issue has already been the subject of dispute at Review Services
and is properly before us. However, we note that under s.14.1 the
result of a finding that the plan is no longer appropriate because
of changed circumstances is that the parties are to negotiate. This
remedy is not only mandated by the Act, but is, in our view,
the appropriate remedy in the circumstances of this case. While we
are prepared to adjudicate whether the changed circumstances render
the plan sufficiently inappropriate to trigger negotiations, we are
not ready to usurp the role and responsibility of the parties to negotiate,
particularly when no real negotiations have occurred to date with
respect to these bargaining units.
26. It is the Employer's position that if violations
of the Act are demonstrated, it has an obligation to negotiate
those offending elements. According to Counsel for the Employer, the
Union's pleadings contain sufficient detail of the alleged violations
to trigger the Employer's obligation to bargain. However, she insists
that the Union's timing is wrong and that it must first return to
Review Services before the Employer need consider the allegations.
She relies on a very technical reading of the Scarborough (No.
1) decision, which we do not adopt. However, in the context of
allegations of violations of the Act, we will consider argument
about what would warrant a reconsideration of the plan.
27. During the hearing on the preliminary motions,
Counsel greatly assisted the Tribunal by agreeing to and preparing
certain documents which set out the chronology of events. We now request
the parties to prepare for the next days of hearing with a similar
approach. In our view, the question before us can be argued on the
basis of an agreed statement of facts. At this time it appears that
the determination we have to make is largely a legal one, although
if findings of fact become necessary, we will do so on the basis of
evidence when required. We look forward to arguments that will address
the circumstances and statutory provisions that give rise to an obligation
to bargain, within the context of these three bargaining units.